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THE STANDARD OF CARE FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS IN
IDAHO: TIME FOR REASSESSMENT
Monique C. Lillard
University of Idaho College of Law
Anna Dulaney, a woman from the state of Washington was vis-
iting Boise.' She fell from a deck and hurt her back. She was taken
to an emergency room, x-rayed and released. A few days later she
collapsed in excruciating pain and was taken back to the emergency
room. The doctors reviewed the two-day-old x-rays, but ordered no
new tests. They again released her, even though she was in such
pain that she was unable to walk. Two days later, she returned home
to Washington. She drove immediately to the emergency room. An
MRI revealed that she had a block in her spine. The delay in treat-
ment allegedly rendered her a paraplegic. She sued, in Idaho, using
Idaho law.
Idaho Code 5 6-1012, enacted in 1976, sets the standard of care
for medical malpractice as a "strict locality standard," that is, the
community standard at the time and place of the alleged malprac-
tice as practiced by those of similar training and qualifications to
the defendant. The "community" is the area served by the local
hospital. Section 6-1013, enacted simultaneously, sets forth exactly
how plaintiff's expert is to be qualified.
Mrs. Dulaney's lawyer was able to find two out-of-state experts
to testify. Their professional credentials were beyond dispute. They
were willing to say, with medical certainty, that the standard on this
matter would not likely vary from one emergency room to another
and that her care would have been inadequate "in any Emergency
Department within the United States of America. ' 2 Even though
Boise, Idaho is part of the United States of America, the woman
could not even get past summary judgment because she was unable
to satisfy the court that she had established the standard of care at
the time and place of her injury.
The strict locality standard, by its very terms, permits the given
community to be an island of negligence; if the defendant estab-
fishes that he was following community custom, he is exonerated,
even if the community custom is out of step with the state and the
nation. But the reported Idaho appellate cases indicate that this
occurs seldom, if ever. Instead, what happens is that plaintiffs are
unable to find a way to establish the standard of care in a given
area. Idaho Code § 6-1013 requires the expert to be familiar with
the local standard of care at the time of the alleged malpractice.
The expert may himself be from the community or may "adequate-
ly familiariz[e] himself with the standards and practices of (a par-
ticular) such area. ' 3 Case law establishes that this can be done by
various means, including telephoning local area practitioners.
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In the case of Mrs. Dulaney, her lawyers asked twenty-two
Idaho orthopedists to confirm to her experts that the local stan-
dard of care conformed to the national standard. None would
speak with them. Her experts were eventually able to speak with
three doctors who had experience in Boise. Yet the district court,
affirmed by a majority of the Idaho Supreme Court, deemed that
they were insufficiently knowledgeable about the relevant standard
of care in her case.
This article reflects the personal view-
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The first was an Idaho doctor, board certified in both
Emergency Medicine and Internal Medicine, who had practiced
internal medicine in Boise, but had not practiced emergency room
medicine in Boise. The record did not indicate that he had become
familiar with the Boise standard of care for emergency room doc-
tors. On the other hand, the record did not indicate that the stan-
dard for emergency room doctors would differ from the standard
applicable to an internist, especially in the context of an alleged
omission to treat. Nonetheless, his information was insufficient to
qualify the expert.
A second doctor was contacted. He lived out of state, but had
practiced in Boise. He was asked about neurological tests per-
formed by the defendant orthopedist. But although he had prac-
ticed neurology in Boise, he had not practiced orthopedics or emer-
gency room medicine in Boise, nor was he asked about the prac-
tices of orthopedic surgeons. The district court was also concerned
that he had practiced in Boise two years before the year of the plain-
tiff's injury His information was insufficient to qualify the expert.
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A third medical doctor was contacted, a professor who had not
practiced in Idaho but who stated that he was familiar with the
standard of care in Boise at the time of the injury He spoke only
anonymously. He and the plaintiff's expert spoke three or four
years after the injury He indicated that he had trained orthopedists
who were "presently" practicing in Boise, but he did not state if
the), were practicing in Boise at the time of the injury. Although he
had lectured in Boise, he did not state when. His information was
insufficient to familiarize the expert with the local standard of care.
Mrs. Dulaney's experts were therefore unqualified to testify,
because they were insufficiently familiar with the standard of care
in Boise, Idaho at the time of her injury. Mrs. Dulaney's case was
dismissed on summary judgment. She never got to trial and the
facts of the case were never publicly aired. This was upheld by the
Idaho Supreme Court in what has become a leading opinion in
medical malpractice.
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This is a troubling result. Anna Dulaney's case is representative
of other cases that have passed through the Idaho courts. Certainly
Dulane is a cautionary tale for the plaintiffs' bar. A case last fall,
Ranos v. Dixon, reiterates that the plaintiff's lawyer must oversee
every aspect of the information gathering necessary for the plain-
tiff's case in chief.7 Conclusory statements of familiarity with the
local standard will not suffice. Experts and local doctors must be
asked precise questions about how they have become familiar with
the local custom. But Dulany, and the approximately forty-five
other standard of care cases decided since Idaho Code § 6-1012
and 5 6-1013 were enacted, reveal some recurring flaws in the sys-
tem.
Mrs. Dulaney was neither the first nor the last plaintiff to dis-
cover the reluctance of doctors to testify against each other.8 Nor
was she alone in experiencing how the strictures of the statute
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compound the medical community's penchant for silence. If the
community sets the standard but the community refuses to talk, it
is difficult to prove violation of the standard. The facts in Dulaney
are particularly disturbing. Five medical professionals had stated on
the record that the standard of care had been violated. One stated:
"What took place was outside the standard of care of modern
Emergency medicine practice." 9 The defendants had not refuted
the standard of care. Even to a lay reader, Mrs. Dulaney's repeated
release from the emergency room seems questionable. 10
Normally when defendants move for summary judgment, the
court construes the record in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion, drawing all reasonable inferences and conclu-
sions in that party's favor. But, because of the specificity of § 6-
1013, the threshold question of I.R.C.P. 56e must be addressed-
whether the information in the supporting affidavits is admissible.
The burden is on the plaintiff to qualify the expert. Thus, by mov-
ing for summary judgment, defendants can force the plaintiff into
an early show of proof. The Idaho courts sometimes take this too
far. Even within the strictures of § 6-1013, district courts may per-
missibly make logical, rational inferences, especially pre-trial; they
should be encouraged to do so. Dulaney is particularly egregious in
this regard. The district court was troubled that one local doctor
had provided information about the standard two years before the
injury. But the expert and the local doctor were saying that standard
was higher than that allegedly met by the defendants. To disallow
that information is to assume that the standard -went down in two
years, which is unlikely and implausible. Similarly, the Idaho
Supreme Court majority was troubled that the anonymous profes-
sor did not specify whether the Boise doctors with whom he was
familiar had practiced at the time of the injury or three years later,
at the time when he was speaking with the expert. The likelihood
of any change in the standard during that three-year window was
small, especially in view of the credible assertions of the two
experts that the standard of care was in fact standard across
America. The professor's assertions were in an affidavit submitted
as part of a motion for reconsideration of a summary judgment;
this was not a situation where a witness on the stand could not
remember crucial facts. There was still time, before trial, to garner
more precise utterances from the professor or others. The majori-
ty's refusal to let the matter proceed to trial seems inflexible, even
within the intentionally narrow confines of the statute.
Dulaney is merely one of several disconcerting medical malprac-
tice cases in the Idaho Reports. The courts should rethink their
application of the law and should encourage the district courts to
make rational and logical inferences. But even so, the courts will be
hemmed in by 6-1-12 and § 6-1013.
Idaho has lived with these statutes for over thirty years-a gen-
eration. The time has come for the legislature to revisit and rethink
the wisdom of the legislation. It was enacted with the express pur-
pose of lowering liability insurance premiums so that Idaho would
become a more attractive state in which to provide health care and
thus attract more and better health care providers. The legislators
intentionally protected defendant doctors at the expense of plain-
tiffs, in the name of increasing the public good. The first question
is whether the legislation has actually attracted doctors. The law of
Idaho is indeed viewed as doctor friendly11 especially when cou-
pled with low non-economic and punitive damage caps and short
statutes of limitations. On the other hand, despite these measures,
recent studies indicate that the number of Idaho doctors is not
keeping up with the state's rapidly growing population, especially
outside of the Boise area. 12 So, the question remains, whether the
"friendly" law is a significant draw to the state. The second ques-
tion is whether the number and quality of Idaho care providers
could be increased at lower cost to patients. The legislature should
engage in fact-finding about who is likely to experience malpractice
and whether the statutes are significantly reducing compensation to
those with legitimate claims. Creative problem solvers across the
nation have been writing about the most effective ways to deter
medical error so as to benefit all patients. Possibly Idaho's current
regime is the best for the state, but if so it should be retained con-
sciously, not through inertia. The time is right for the Idaho legis-
lature to begin the process of discerning the optimal means of
increasing the availability of high quality medical care across the
state.
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